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Leaders attend a news conference after a meeting to prepare the upcoming NATO summit, in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 14.EVA PLEVIER/Reuters

A dozen years ago, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization last overhauled its strategic concept, the military alliance seemed to have lost its purpose – because it had won.

The United States and Western Europe had triumphed in the Cold War and enjoyed military-technological supremacy on the global stage. In the early part of the past decade, no one contemplated war on European soil. Russia did not seem a threat to the West – its seizure of Crimea would happen a few years later, in 2014 – and China had yet to become a superpower apparently bent on taking Taiwan by force.

Collective defence and deterrence, by NATO’s own admission, “were considered almost superfluous” because there was no great power competition. NATO and its member states were the undisputed military leaders, even if Russia and China were loaded to the teeth with nuclear bombs.

NATO’s 2010 strategic concept is not just dated; it seems a quaint relic of a simpler time. “China” did not even appear in the text and Russia, as unlikely as it sounds today, was being courted as strategic partner. Dmitry Medvedev, then Russia’s president, attended that summit, held in Lisbon.

NATO’s three-day Madrid summit, which begins on Tuesday, will, for the first time, address China’s potential role as a strategic competitor, though not a military threat; it will also label Russia as a clear and present danger to Europe, home of the majority of NATO’s 30 member states. At a presummit news conference on Wednesday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called Russia “the most significant and direct threat to our security.”

The summit will also attempt to formalize the memberships of Finland and Sweden, and – crucially – expand the combat-ready presence in the Baltic states and other parts of NATO’s eastern flank.

Overall, Madrid is seen as one of the most important summits since NATO was formed in 1949. But one or two of the summit’s most important goals may not be met, or not met fast enough to declare the event a full success.

Strengthening NATO’s defence capabilities, especially of the rapid-force variety, will emerge as the summit’s most urgent task as the war in Ukraine grinds on. Doing so will not be easy since most of the NATO members’ defence spending, including Canada’s, is below the alliance’s 2 per cent of GDP target.

Russia launched the invasion in February and may not stop at Ukraine’s borders if it takes all of the country, which seems unlikely but is not out of the question as the Ukrainian military runs short of ammunition and takes an alarming number of casualties.

Certainly, small NATO countries in the old Soviet orbit – notably Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose borders press onto Russia or those of its war ally, Belarus – are terrified that they are next on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hit list.

In an interview earlier this week, Kusti Salm, permanent secretary at the Estonia defence ministry, said that a Russian military helicopter recently entered Estonian airspace. Estonia’s military believed the incursion was no accident. “This is the picture of the threat,” he said. “It has never been as serious as it is now.”

Later in the week, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told reporters that her country would be “wiped off the map” under the existing NATO plans to defend the country, and the other Baltic states, from a Russian attack. She is lobbying NATO for a full division – about 20,000 soldiers – to be allocated each to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Her fear, and that of the other Baltic states’ leaders, is that existing NATO and national military assets would be incapable of repelling a Russia attack from Day 1, meaning the countries might be overrun before NATO could mount a robust counterattack. Ms. Kallas, who has been called “Europe’s new Iron Lady,” said NATO’s existing plan when it comes to Estonia is “to lose it and liberate it afterwards.”

Mr. Stoltenberg has vowed to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank deterrence and defence capabilities, but has not given operational details; they might emerge in Madrid. Since 2017, the three Baltic states have each hosted a NATO battalion of about 1,000 soldiers (Canada has almost 700 troops in Latvia). Recently, Germany proposed devoting a “robust combat brigade” to Lithuania. But most of its soldiers would be based in Germany, with the ability to move into Lithuania quickly.

Whatever the outcome in Madrid, Ms. Kallas and the other Baltic leaders will likely be disappointed. The Baltic states will almost certainly get more NATO boots on the ground, but likely brigade size (up to about 5,000 troops), not expensive full divisions.

NATO’s enlargement efforts may also come up short in Madrid. Turkey is a crucial NATO member: it has sold drones to Ukraine and closed access to the Black Sea to Russian warships. The bad news for NATO is that is has not placed sanctions on Russia and has blocked the admission of Sweden and Finland to the alliance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is insisting that the Nordic countries extradite several members of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which it has banned, and end the partial arms embargo against Turkey.

The issues seem surmountable, though Turkey has hinted it could hold up Sweden’s and Finland’s entry for a year. On June 20, NATO hosted a meeting with representatives of the three countries to push for a breakthrough before the summit. But hopes are fading that Turkey will sign off in Madrid. “Turkey has legitimate security concerns over terrorism that we need to address,” Mr. Stoltenberg said.

Until the two Scandinavia countries gain membership, they would not be protected by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which deems an attack on one member state to be an attack on all. But that would not stop individual NATO countries from offering Sweden and Finland security guarantees. The U.K. has already offered to do so.

All of which leaves the publication and adoption of NATO’s new strategic concept as the only sure thing in Madrid.

The concept is overhauled about once a decade. It will address NATO’s intense and suddenly alarming security issues. Russia has gone from potential partner to threat. China could pose a systemic challenge to global security. But NATO will also address climate change, cyberattacks, supply chain disruptions, technological innovation and adequate defence spending. It wants the 2 per cent of GDP goal to be a floor, not a ceiling.

Above all, it will recognize that the great power competition has returned – an admission that the Euro-Atlantic region is no longer the focus of geopolitical and geostrategic developments. That focus is shifting to Asia. “Critically, the Alliance will need to develop a more global approach to security,” NATO says.

In other words, NATO wants to go global to keep itself relevant. Its new role will not be all about Russia.

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