A Japan Self Defence Force pilot and ground crew check an F-15 fighter as it is refuelled at Hyakuri Air Base near Tokyo on Sept. 29, 2022.The Associated Press
Beginning next month, Japan’s military budget will be the largest it has been since the end of the Second World War, when the country adopted an officially pacifist constitution.
Spending on the Japanese Self-Defence Forces is due to double from around 1 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP over the next five years, with a total budget during this time of 43 trillion yen – about $448-billion – for expanding capabilities and shoring up defences. This will make Japan the world’s third-largest military spender, behind only the United States and China.
This investment comes after Tokyo released three new strategy documents late last year, drastically revising the country’s defence posture to face what Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has described as Japan’s “most severe and complex” security environment in decades. In public, Japanese officials insist this is not because of any specific adversary, talking of a range of threats and an increasingly uncertain international situation. Reading between the lines, however, there is little doubt as to the primary driver.
“It’s all about China,” said Ken Jimbo, a security expert at Tokyo’s Keio University. In particular, he said, Japan is concerned by the risk of being pulled into war over Taiwan, if China ever follows through on its threats to invade the self-ruled democracy.
Such a possibility was driven home for many Japanese last August, when China staged massive military drills around Taiwan during a visit by then-U.S. house speaker Nancy Pelosi. Five missiles fired as part of those exercises landed in Japanese waters off the island of Yonaguni, the country’s westernmost territory, around 100 kilometres from Taiwan.
Japan’s potential missile capabilities
if deployed in Okinawa
1
555 km
Norwegian Joint Strike Missile
2
900 km
Type 12 surface-to-ship missile
3
1,600 km
U.S. Tomahawk missiles
4
2,000 to 3,000 km
Proposed range for missiles to be developed by 2030
RUSSIA
MONGOLIA
Beijing
JAPAN
N. KOREA
S. KOREA
Tokyo
CHINA
Shanghai
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1
Okinawa
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PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
CHINA
Yonaguni
Taipei
Taiwan
Strait
TAIWAN
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County
MURAT YÜKSELIR / THE GLOBE AND MAIL
Japan’s potential missile capabilities
if deployed in Okinawa
1
555 km
Norwegian Joint Strike Missile
2
900 km
Type 12 surface-to-ship missile
3
1,600 km
U.S. Tomahawk missiles
4
2,000 to 3,000 km
Proposed range for missiles to be developed by 2030
RUSSIA
MONGOLIA
Beijing
JAPAN
N. KOREA
S. KOREA
Tokyo
CHINA
Shanghai
4
4
3
2
1
Okinawa
VIETNAM
TAIWAN
LAOS
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
CHINA
Yonaguni
Taipei
Taiwan
Strait
2
1
TAIWAN
Kinmen
County
MURAT YÜKSELIR / THE GLOBE AND MAIL
Japan’s potential missile capabilities if deployed in Okinawa
CHINA
Yonaguni
Taipei
Taiwan
Strait
RUSSIA
TAIWAN
Kinmen
County
MONGOLIA
JAPAN
N. KOREA
Beijing
Sea of Japan
S. KOREA
Tokyo
Yellow
Sea
CHINA
Shanghai
Okinawa
Taipei
VIETNAM
TAIWAN
Philippine Sea
South
China Sea
LAOS
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
2,000 to 3,000 km
Proposed range for missiles to be developed by 2030
1,600 km
U.S. Tomahawk missiles
900 km
Type 12 surface-
to-ship missile
555 km
Norwegian Joint
Strike Missile
MURAT YÜKSELIR / THE GLOBE AND MAIL
“People have started to feel a real threat from China,” said Tomoko Ako, a China studies professor at the University of Tokyo. “They feel we have to prepare for future risk.”
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has depended on the U.S. to a large degree for its security, but a Japanese defence official said the recent conflict in Europe had shaken this assumption. Ukraine couldn’t prevent the invasion from Russia despite support from the U.S., which shows the need for building up Japan’s defence, the official said. The Globe is not identifying the official, who was not authorized to speak publicly.
The official added that the country’s current ballistic missile defence is rapidly becoming out of date, particularly with the growing threat of China’s hypersonic arsenal: missiles that can travel up to five times the speed of sound.
Japan’s new National Defence Strategy, published last December, identifies seven “functions and capabilities required to adapt to the new ways of warfare.” These include expanding the country’s long-range missile arsenal and creating an integrated air and missile defence, with the intention to “deter and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself.”
As part of this, Japan is developing new domestic anti-ship missiles, while Tokyo has announced plans to buy 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the U.S., with the first to be deployed by mid-2026. Japan is also investing in Norwegian air-launched cruise missiles, and building out its air force with new F-35 fighters and anti-submarine helicopters.
Tomahawks have a range of up to 1,600 kilometres, which, if deployed to southern Okinawa prefecture, could threaten bases inside China, as well as any forces in the Taiwan Strait. Tokyo has also said it plans to develop 2,000- to 3,000-kilometre-range missiles by 2030, as well as hypersonic launch vehicles.
Dr. Jimbo said Japan will never be able to match China missile-for-missile or ship-for-ship, given how much of a head start the well-funded People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has had in recent years. “It’s almost impossible to catch up with their capabilities,” he said.
This month, China announced a 7.3-per-cent increase in its annual military budget, to 1.5 trillion yuan – $299-billion – or more than half of what Japan intends to spend between now and 2027.
But through developing new strike capabilities and expanding its navy, Japan could nevertheless have a major effect on China’s decision-making around any potential invasion of Taiwan, Dr. Jimbo said.
“An amphibious mission is very vulnerable because they have to send those ground troops by ship,” he said. “And if we have enough anti-ship missiles, that’s going to be a huge issue for the PLA. Before 2020, China only had to think about U.S. strike capabilities.”
Japan’s constitution renounces “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” While some have argued this precludes even the existence of the Self-Defence Forces, most Japanese are comfortable with the idea of maintaining a military for such a purpose, a right the government says is protected under international law.
Since 2014, Tokyo has interpreted the constitution as also allowing for “collective self-defence,” a far more controversial stance. This could mean Japan going to war to protect an ally, most likely the U.S., even if it was not immediately threatened. Opposition parties have pushed the government to outline exactly what circumstances would entail this, something officials have refused to do, arguing this would undermine deterrence. While the government can take action to defend Japan, it must seek approval from the National Diet, the country’s legislature, to exercise collective self-defence.
A war over Taiwan would likely fall within both categories, Dr. Jimbo said. Such a conflict would almost certainly involve the United States, “and Japan may be called on to enable the U.S. to fight,” which, given the importance of the alliance, could be seen as an act of collective self-defence. But a Chinese invasion would also severely endanger Yonaguni and other Japanese islands close to Taiwan, potentially creating another pretext for Tokyo to engage.
The first stage of Japan’s new defence strategy is due to be completed by 2027, a year that China has set for its own military modernization, and one that some have posited for a potential invasion of Taiwan, given the PLA’s rapidly growing capabilities. Dr. Jimbo said he was skeptical of such short timelines owing to the logistical and military challenge of any Taiwan operation, but added that it was important to increase deterrence as fast as possible.
“We are trying to close the window of opportunity,” he said. “We have to talk loudly for our voices to be heard in Beijing.”
Washington has been trying to line up a strong deterrent to any potential Chinese move, encouraging allies, including Canada, to play a bigger role in maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. This week saw the U.S., Britain and Australia finalize a deal to sell nuclear-powered subs to Canberra, something Beijing has warned risks sparking an arms race and could sour recently improving ties between Australia and China.
For Tokyo, too, taking a firmer stance on Taiwan has to be balanced with not spoiling relations with the country’s largest trading partner. Unlike Canada and the U.S., which have seen ties with China fray in recent months, Japan has managed to maintain relatively open communication.
This balancing act can be seen in the National Defence Strategy itself, which notes China’s military activities and external stance “have become a matter of serious concern for Japan” and present “the greatest strategic challenge” to the country. At the same time, however, the document shies away from describing China as a “threat,” as it does North Korea – which has repeatedly fired missiles over Japan.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mr. Kishida met last November, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi has been invited to visit China later this year, the first time a Japanese foreign minister will have done so since 2019.
Two Japanese officials with knowledge of discussions said despite often-difficult disputes with Beijing, the door remains open for Tokyo in a way it is not with many of China’s other rivals. The Globe is not identifying the officials as they were not authorized to speak publicly.
But while Tokyo insists it is not targeting China and officials are keen to downplay any rift between the two sides, Beijing has taken a far more forceful tone in public. Speaking this month, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang warned Japan against “forgetting history” in its military buildup and referenced the country’s invasion of China.
“China always treats Japan with goodwill and hopes for friendship,” Mr. Qin said. “Yet, should some people from the Japanese side … take part in a new Cold War to contain China, the bilateral relations would only suffer new wounds when the old ones are yet to be healed.”
James Griffiths visited Japan in March on a Foreign Press Center Japan fellowship. FPCJ did not review or approve this content.