A federal inquiry into foreign interference heard today from parliamentary security officials including House of Commons sergeant-at-arms Patrick McDonell. McDonell carries the mace out of the House of Commons Chamber after the house rises, on Parliament Hill in Ottawa on Thursday, Dec. 13, 2018.Justin Tang/The Canadian Press
A handful of people seeking employment with MPs’ offices have been rejected because of national-security concerns about their potential involvement in foreign-interference activities, according to House of Commons Sergeant-at-Arms Patrick McDonell.
Two staff applications for MPs’ offices were turned down in the last six months, Mr. McDonell told the public inquiry into foreign interference Tuesday. He did not provide further details or name the MPs who put the names forward for employment.
“I have denied, let’s say, a handful in the last 10 years. Two of them being in the last six months,” he testified.
In 2023, Mr. McDonell said his office conducted 128 resolution-of-doubt interviews with people seeking to work for MPs.
Mr. McDonell said the Canadian Security Intelligence Service investigates potential employees for the Commons and MPs for loyalty to Canada while the RCMP takes care of criminal background checks. If either organization says they have a “resolution of doubt” about the applicant, the office of the Sergeant-of-Arms will interview them. The final decision to reject the applicant is made by Mr. McDonell even if the MP disagrees with the decision, he said.
As The Globe and Mail first reported last year, a 2021 top-secret intelligence assessment from CSIS provided to the newspaper said the People’s Republic of China (PRC) targets political staffers because they often act as “gatekeepers” for MPs.
The assessment said Beijing targets staffers for MPs because “staffers control schedules,” and the power they have to manage who the parliamentarian meets places “them in positions where they can deceptively control and influence the activities of elected officials in ways that support PRC interests.”
“This occurs in many ways, such as ensuring specific community group requests are not seen or responded to; framing talking points to reflect Chinese Communist Party narratives; or holding public events at specific locations of interest to the PRC (e.g. a business owned by a PRC proxy or a culturally significant location such as a city hall or legislative building).”
In October, 2020, the CSIS report said, a former employee working for a member of an unnamed provincial legislator was fired for passing on information to a “person of high interest” to the spy agency “who is closely associated with the PRC Mission in Canada.”
“The confidential information included details on the elected official’s activities, donor information, as well as office logistics and other staffers. Moreover, the former employee manipulated the official’s schedule to ensure the MLA attended certain unspecified events,” the CSIS document said.
Commissioner won’t name parliamentarians allegedly collaborating with foreign power
Mr. McDonell, a former assistant commissioner of the RCMP who oversees House of Commons security, said a number of new positions have opened in his office that relate to security, including briefing MPs on foreign interference.
He also told the inquiry that his office deals with daily threats to members of Parliament. The Commons security works closely with the RCMP on these threats, he said.
Mr. McDonell said MPs have been given mobile duress devices to alert authorities when faced with a potential danger while the Commons also provides security for their secondary residences in Ottawa or at public events.
The Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms is also a participant of INTERSECT, which is a community of first responders in the Ottawa region that includes law enforcement, fire and emergency services. This body shares a variety of intelligence products with its members, including the House of Commons. There has been increased information sharing through INTERSECT since the Freedom Convoy protests in 2022.
The inquiry also heard from the Commons Chief Information Officer, Benoît Dicaire, about revelations earlier this year that 18 legislators in Canada were targeted in 2021 by hackers linked to Beijing.
China’s hacking of Canadian members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China was discovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which passed on the information to Ottawa in 2022. The government then informed Parliament, but MPs and senators were not told of this warning.
Conservative MP Garnett Genuis told the inquiry last week that he would have liked to have been notified about the cyberattack so he could better protect himself.
Mr. Dicaire said there was no need to inform MPs and senators because the hack was not successful.
“Parliament is a prime target. We’re dealing with hundreds of millions of attacks, attempts in a year. So the practicality of briefing everyone at every instance would create a serious operational burden,” he said. “And most of those are thwarted either by controls in place or by infrastructure that is in place.”
But Mr. Dicaire said his office does inform MPs when there is a serious threat to their data or mobile and computer devices.
He added that the Commons works co-operatively with the Communications Security Establishment, which is Canada’s ultra-secret signals and cyber intelligence agency.
The inquiry heard last week that Ottawa provides no cyber protection for personal smartphones MPs carry. It’s not uncommon for MPs to carry two devices, with one supplied by the House of Commons and the other a personal phone – a second target for hackers.
Mr. Dicaire said his role is to protect parliamentary devices, not the personal phones of MPs.
The Chinese hacking group that went after Canadian MPs had ties to the government in Beijing and has been nicknamed Advanced Persistent Threat 31 or “APT31.″