Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue asks a question to David Vigneault, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, third from right, as CSIS representatives appear at the Foreign Interference Commission in Ottawa on Friday, Sept. 27, 2024.Justin Tang/The Canadian Press
A former Canadian parliamentarian is suspected of trying to influence Parliament’s business on behalf of a foreign government, according to documents tabled Friday at the Hogue inquiry into foreign interference.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, in co-operation with other federal government security agencies, produced a list of six significant instances of suspected foreign meddling since 2019.
The CSIS documents detail a previously unknown instance of an individual who was “suspected of having worked to influence parliamentary business on behalf of a foreign government.”
The documents did not identify the parliamentarian or explain whether they were a member of Parliament or a senator. They also did not reveal which foreign country the parliamentarian was assisting.
They also disclose for the first time an incident where another unidentified foreign government tried to sabotage the election of a Liberal candidate for federal office.
“Reporting indicates a foreign government undertook several actions, including interference, to reduce the likelihood of a specific Liberal candidate from being elected federally,” the documents said. “It is suspected that the foreign government sought to thwart the candidate given their support for issues perceived to be contrary to the foreign government’s interests.”
The other four cases were previously reported in the media and discussed at the public inquiry, including attempts by proxy agents of India to clandestinely fund favoured candidates in three political parties.
The documents also reveal that Pakistani officials attempted to “clandestinely influence” Canadian federal politics.
The inquiry heard testimony Friday from CSIS about the findings of a report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, an oversight body for national-security and intelligence organizations set up by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
NSICOP said earlier this year that Canadian intelligence agencies gathered information indicating some federal politicians are collaborating with foreign governments to advance their own interests.
The NSICOP report said some politicians are accepting money from foreign governments and are communicating frequently with them to obtain support from community groups and businesses that foreign diplomats have promised to mobilize to help political campaigns.
Other parliamentarians allegedly provided privileged information to foreign diplomats about fellow colleagues in Parliament as a way to press them to change positions. Some also allegedly leaked confidential information to foreign intelligence officers.
The inquiry heard that the names of the parliamentarians were not identified in the NSICOP report.
Bo Basler, who runs CSIS’s counterinterference operations, said the spy service has figured out the names of all the parliamentarians suspected of collaborating with foreign states either wittingly or unwittingly.
But he said CSIS will not release those names to avoid tipping off foreign states who recruited the politicians.
“It would reveal to the adversary, the foreign governments, that are engaged with the MPs that we know about a specific activity at a point in time, which would then potentially reveal the method of collection that we had in targeting the threat actor,” he said.
Justice Marie-Josée Hogue was asked by the House of Commons to investigate these parliamentarians and make recommendations about what to do about them. She has said that Canadians will not learn the names of the parliamentarians.
She said the Inquiries Act also prevents her from making adverse findings against people unless they have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the charge of possible misconduct.
Interim CSIS director Vanessa Lloyd told the inquiry Friday that China is the principal foreign-influence threat to Canada, followed by India.
She said one aim of Beijing’s foreign-interference operations is to try to influence and recruit “individuals who are most friendliest or willing to represent and advance the interests of China in our electoral processes, both at the provincial and federal levels.”
As for India, Ms. Lloyd said New Delhi focuses on the Indian-Canadian diaspora and tries to influence government institutions with a “pro-Hindu, pro-nationalist agenda” and sway those Canadian Sikhs who advocate for an independent Sikh homeland in Punjab.