Rubble and a damaged car at the site where a residential building was heavily damaged during a Russian missile attack, in central Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Jan. 2.STRINGER/Reuters
Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
This week marks a grim milestone: It has been 1,000 days since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But it also marks something more future-oriented. The latest developments may represent the beginning of the end of the war, ahead of a potentially difficult and protracted negotiated settlement – even if it takes beyond 2025 to conclude.
The big shift, in recent weeks, has come not on the battlefield, but from the election of Donald Trump on Nov. 5 for a second U.S. presidential term. Mr. Trump’s pledge to end the war in a day is probably fanciful, but he is very likely to press one if not both sides to try to end the war when he assumes the presidency in January.
This seems to have been understood by both Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky. Mr. Putin appears to be escalating Moscow’s offensive with a new round of devastating air strikes in Ukraine; meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent decision to allow Ukraine to fire Western-made, long-range missiles into Russian territory has been welcomed by Mr. Zelensky. Those missiles were used on Tuesday to strike targets in Russia’s Bryansk region.
Mr. Biden’s decision has been heavily criticized by Mr. Putin, who responded by officially lowering the threshold under which Russia can use its nuclear weapons. And while Mr. Biden had been cautious about green-lighting those missiles, one of the key drivers behind his reversal appears to have been the entry of thousands of North Koreans into the war on the side of Russia, particularly in its campaign to take back the Kursk region from Ukrainian forces.
While there has been much media coverage this week of the pros and cons of the President’s decision, it is unlikely to be a game-changer at this point. The decision, which could be reversed by Mr. Trump as soon as he comes to power in January, has probably come too late in Mr. Biden’s term to make a significant impact, particularly if the missiles are limited in their use to the Kursk region.
Rather than either side seeking to “win” the war, it is much more realistic that the goal for both Moscow and Kyiv is to maximize battlefield gains ahead of any peace negotiation to come.
Russia has been making gains in Ukraine that have mostly extinguished Western hopes that Ukraine might achieve all of its strategic war objectives. Take the example of Lord Ricketts, a former British national security adviser who now believes there is a growing possibility of a Korea-style scenario, with Russia keeping control of around a fifth of prewar Ukraine and the remainder moving in a pro-Western direction in the years to come.
One key question, in this context, is what Europe’s stance on the war in Ukraine will be come January. Ukraine’s future security is a key interest for the EU, and there was much talk at the G20 this week about next steps.
While Europe’s strategy is not yet finalized, what is certain is that the continent will need a clear, co-ordinated approach if it is to have significant influence in the coming weeks. It will therefore be concerning to many that there is a split over Mr. Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles, which has been welcomed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, but not by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who holds the G7 chair.
Still, Western leaders – including even Ms. Meloni – know that any outcome in Ukraine that is perceived as a big Russian victory may only embolden Mr. Putin and his allies across the world. They have a strategic interest in ensuring the best possible outcome for Kyiv.
With huge uncertainties over what the Trump presidency will bring in terms of policy, there is growing recognition that Europe may well need to step up to the plate much more. Mr. Trump may soon create a gap in critical funding that only Europe and allies such as Canada, Japan and Australia can try to at least partially fill. There is also a need for clearer grand strategy too, including the potential political integration of Ukraine into the West. This includes Brussels moving forward with accession talks for Ukraine to potentially join the EU. Beyond that, the West can also put Kyiv onto a pathway to possible NATO membership too.
Taken together, the war is now entering a new phase. Given huge uncertainty ahead for Ukraine, now is the moment for Europe to double down on its commitment to Mr. Zelensky given the huge incentives they have to bolster his negotiating position ahead of 2025.