The Houthis are doomed to fail – but in another sense, they’ve already won

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Dennis Horak was Canada’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen from 2015 to 2018 and chargé d’affaires in Iran from 2009 to 2012.

Almost from the outset of the Israel-Hamas war, there were concerns about regional escalation, with most eyes understandably focused on Israel’s northern border, where Hezbollah could join the fight from Lebanon.

But few experts predicted that Yemen’s Houthi rebels would begin firing missiles at commercial and merchant ships in the Red Sea to blockade Israel in support of Hamas.

Perhaps they should have. This is not the first time the Houthis have reached beyond Yemen’s borders; at various times since the start of the country’s civil war in 2014, Houthi drones and missiles have targeted cities, airports and even oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While those attacks were carried out in the context of the war, they demonstrated a capacity and willingness to use their weapons to advance their cause outside Yemen.

The nature of the Israel-Hamas conflict ticks a lot of boxes for the Houthis. Their support for Gaza is consistent with their ideological affinity toward the Palestinians and antipathy toward Israel. The attacks also raise their profile on an issue of global significance, and they signal the group’s readiness to play an active role in countering Israel and the West, now that the hard slogging of their own civil war appears to be behind them.

None of this would be possible without the support of Iran. While the Iranians have not directed the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea – that’s not how they operate with their partners or proxies – they have provided the wherewithal to make them effective. As the United States has noted, Iran is “deeply involved” in the Houthi attacks, including through the provision of intelligence, equipment and planning expertise, and while the Iranians have of course denied the U.S.’s accusations, the charges are certainly consistent with Iranian goals and methods in the region. No one believes the Iranians, and that’s fine with Tehran: They can still take credit in the circles that matter to them, while maintaining at least a veil of deniability to avoid being drawn directly into the conflict.

In response to the ship attacks and the threat to free navigation, the United States has assembled a coalition of more than 20 countries under Operation Prosperity Guardian, to ensure the safety of shipping through the Red Sea. While the coalition has been successful in intercepting incoming fire from Yemen since arriving in the region, it remains to be seen whether the protection being provided will be sufficient to convince international shipping companies to resume passage through the Red Sea. So far it hasn’t.

What may seem surprising about the coalition is that it does not include Saudi Arabia, which would typically support American efforts to weaken the Houthis. Riyadh led a nine-country intervention on Yemen’s civil war in 2015, largely to prevent the emergence of an Iranian proxy that would be willing and able to wreak havoc on their southern border at Tehran’s behest. But they lost that fight on the ground and in the air in Yemen, and now the Red Sea attacks have shown how very real that proxy nightmare is becoming for Riyadh. Bringing the U.S. into conflict with a mutual foe would seem like a no-brainer.

But the Saudis and most other Arab partners have decided not to join the coalition because there are too many downsides to lining up with Washington in this particular fight. They do not want to be seen to be opposing Houthi operations that are ostensibly aimed at helping Palestinians, no matter how problematic their actions may be. The Saudis are also concerned that support for the coalition could adversely affect peace talks with the Houthis, which are aimed at helping Riyadh extricate itself from the Yemeni quagmire. Instead of assisting, then, the Saudis will likely press the coalition to exercise restraint in responding to Houthi attacks, so as to prevent a wounded militia from turning its sights back to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, in retaliation for their Western partners’ actions.

If the coalition’s prospects for success are uncertain, the Houthis’ chances of achieving their stated goal are virtually nil. Disrupting Red Sea shipping will have no effect on the conduct of the war in Gaza, and that’s probably okay for the Houthis and their sponsors in Tehran, because their point has already been made. In their narrative, the Houthis and Iran have demonstrated their solidarity with the Palestinians and their willingness to stand up to the West, while exposing the timidity of other Arab countries who talk a big game, but do nothing. For Iran and the Houthis, that’s the win they care most about.