It was the right decision for David Johnston to resign from whatever his job was, whoever’s decision it was.
Still, amongst the things for which there will have to be a reckoning when this is all over is why he was appointed in the first place. Mr. Johnston himself never seemed to understand what he had walked into or why he should not have walked into it – to the last, in his letter of resignation, he put the opposition down to the “highly partisan atmosphere” – but the Prime Minister and his people did. They appointed him not in spite of his unsuitability, but because of it.
I think it is safe to say they did not hire him for his skills as a forensic investigator. They hired him as a buffer: someone whose good reputation would rub off on their own; an amiable, well-meaning chap who would not ask too many questions but make some high-minded recommendations of a general kind.
Perhaps they were so clueless as not to have understood how his multiple personal and professional associations with Justin Trudeau disqualified him as an investigator who could inspire public trust, on an issue that badly required it: allegations that China interfered in our elections to help the Liberals and hurt the Conservatives, interference that the government may have known about but apparently did nothing to stop. But I doubt it.
I think the calculation, rather, was this: heads, he helps us skate past this, and no one dares question him; tails, the opposition objects, and we accuse them of “viciously smearing this good man.” If the Johnston appointment was cynical, more so was the decision to leave him in his post, long after it was evident he could not carry on.
To be sure, Pierre Poilievre has a talent for making everything that comes out of his mouth sound like a low blow. But that does not absolve the Prime Minister of his responsibility for this mess.
It could, after all, have been so easily avoided. Rather than stonewall and deflect for weeks on end after the reports of unheeded intelligence warnings first appeared, he could simply have presented himself before the requisite parliamentary committee and answered any and all questions about what he knew when about China’s activities, what he did or did not do about it, and why.
Better yet, he could have called a public inquiry, and consulted with the opposition parties on who should lead it. Remarkably enough, that seems to be where we are now headed. Having accepted Mr. Johnston’s report ruling out a public inquiry, the Prime Minister on Saturday sent out his political lieutenant, Dominic Leblanc, to claim that a public inquiry had never been ruled out.
What is more, there will apparently be talks with the opposition on its terms of reference, including who should lead it. “We’re now giving the opposition parties something they’ve asked for,” Mr. Leblanc announced: “a chance to have input directly into that process.”
It was presented as an act of supreme magnanimity, or perhaps as a rebuke – here you go, you spoiled brats – and not as what it was, which was the government at last agreeing to do what it should have done months ago.
We shall see how genuine this offer turns out to be. Nevertheless, it will be on the opposition leaders to listen to any constructive proposals the government might offer, and to respond in like fashion. The public can judge who is or is not bargaining in good faith.
What principles should guide their discussions? The key point about a public inquiry is not that it’s public, but that it’s an inquiry – a proper inquiry, that is, with powers to compel witnesses, to hear evidence under oath, to cross-examine witnesses and so forth. Mere public “hearings,” as Mr. Johnston proposed, would not cut it.
As for the scope, the negotiators should be guided by what an inquiry is for – why those powers are needed. We do not need an inquiry to tell us what the Chinese are up to – that is what the intelligence services are for – or how to counter it: we have ample means of developing and debating public policy already.
We need an inquiry to get at the things that cannot otherwise be got at: the internal decisions and deliberations of government. We do not need such inquiries at most times. We need them when government has made a mess of things, and won’t come clean about how it happened. We need an inquiry most when a government is most reluctant to hold one.