Timothy Garton Ash is professor of European studies at the University of Oxford and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
By next Monday, Vladimir Putin will have been “re-elected” president of Russia. In truth, Russian voters have no genuine choice, since Mr. Putin has killed his most formidable opponent, Alexey Navalny, and ordered the disqualification of any other candidate who presented even a small chance of competition. This procedure will also be implemented in some parts of eastern Ukraine. Large percentages for both turnout and the vote for Mr. Putin must be expected, and will be no more accurate than his historical essays on Russo-Ukrainian relations.
Encouraged by signs of Western weakness, Russia’s brutal dictator will continue to try to conquer more of Ukraine. Mr. Putin believes that Ukraine belongs historically to a Russia whose manifest destiny is to be a great, imperial power. Unlike Western governments, his regime is both politically and economically committed to continuing this war.
Yet these last few weeks have shown us that there’s still an Other Russia, as there was an Other Germany even at the height of Adolf Hitler’s power in the Third Reich. Tens of thousands of Russians of all ages and classes took the risk of reprisals to pay tribute to Mr. Navalny, covering his grave in a mountain of flowers.
Other brave campaigners for a better Russia are in prison, and we must fear for their lives. Outside the country, Yulia Navalnaya carries on her husband’s fight with extraordinary courage and dignity. Giving a fine example of the more “innovative” politics she recently advocated to the European Parliament, she has called for Navalny supporters to turn out at polling stations this Sunday at high noon, to create a visible image of the Other Russia without directly endangering any individual.
It’s impossible to gauge how much support this Other Russia has inside the country. An estimated 20,000 protesters have been arrested since the beginning of the full-scale invasion just over two years ago. Increased repression produces increased fear. On top of this comes the psychological difficulty of accepting that your country, which sees itself as the historic victim of invaders, is itself a criminal aggressor.
An experienced observer who still lives in Russia tells me he reckons some 20 per cent of the population actively support Mr. Putin, 20 per cent actively oppose him, and 60 per cent passively accept things – without enthusiasm, but also without a belief that change can come from below. That can only be a guess. Of one thing alone we can be certain: if the Other Russia finally triumphs, the number of those who all along supported it will multiply like relics of the true cross.
Whatever happens this weekend, it would be naive to expect regime change in the Kremlin any time soon. In truth, the only statement one can confidently make about Russia’s future is that no one knows when or how political change will come.
How, in these circumstances, to craft a Russia policy? A brilliant observer of Russian affairs has commented that before 2022, the West had a Russia policy but no Ukraine policy, whereas now it has a Ukraine policy but no Russia policy. I would argue that our Ukraine policy is our Russia policy – and the only effective one available at the moment. That’s also because Mr. Putin’s Ukraine policy is his Russia policy.
Former Russian president and leading Putin-amplifier Dmitry Medvedev recently stood in front of a giant map, on which all of Ukraine except a tiny rump around Kyiv was shown as Russia, and declared, “Ukraine is definitely Russia.” Notice the ultimate colonial grammar: not Ukraine “belongs with” Russia, but Ukraine is Russia. Compare: Ireland is Britain (1916), Poland is Germany (1939), Algeria is France (1954). A Russia that incorporates Ukraine remains an empire. A Russia without Ukraine must start down the painful road travelled by former colonial powers, from empire to something like a more “normal” nation-state.
That process usually takes decades. More immediately, however, a victory for Ukraine would be a major defeat for Mr. Putin and is more likely to catalyze political change in Russia than any alternative scenario.
In the short run, this will bring an increased risk of an escalatory response from Mr. Putin. For that reason, a realistic Russia policy must include keeping open all possible lines of information-gathering and communication with Russia; detailed contingency planning for every eventuality, from worst to best; and clear messaging to the Kremlin about the cost of further escalation. The West should also do more to support the Other Russia wherever it can, which at the moment means mainly outside Russia and through virtual channels.
We are at the beginning of a new period of European history and what we do this year will have consequences for decades to come. Enabling Ukraine to win this war is not just the only way to secure a democratic, peaceful future for Ukraine itself. It’s also the best thing we can do to improve the long-term chances for a better Russia.