Israeli diplomat Abba Eban famously said that his country’s Arab neighbours “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” But missing opportunities is also an old Israeli habit.
The abrupt decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership presents one of those rare opportunities. And the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is almost certainly going to miss it.
Israel has long wanted to secure its northern border by removing Hezbollah from Lebanon, a move that would also diminish Iran’s power across the Middle East. Most Arab governments share these objectives, though they won’t say it too loudly.
The road to achieving these twin goals has been suddenly opened by Israel’s surprising military success against Hezbollah. But this opening created by military means can only be secured through diplomacy, deal-making and politics. A lasting peace on Israel’s northern border cannot be accomplished by Israel alone, or by military means alone. That’s the lesson of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and its dismal aftermath.
The Netanyahu government has talked about “escalating to de-escalate” in Lebanon. It’s usually a tactic of threatening the other side into backing down. But it can also be about shooting for an even bigger prize. Consider what happened after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Egypt had been humiliated and crushed by Israel six years earlier, in the Six-Day War, but the sequel was a different story. Israel prevailed, but it was a near-run thing. Anwar Sadat’s regime told the Egyptian public that, even though it had not reconquered Sinai, it had won a pride-restoring victory.
That allowed Sadat to dare to do the forbidden: talking to Israel. In 1978, he signed the land-for-peace Camp David accords. Israel returned Sinai to Egypt, and Egypt recognized Israel.
Sadat would later be assassinated by Islamists who believed in a different sort of opportunity. They wanted to “escalate to escalate” – to wage war until Israel’s destruction. That remains the position of Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran. They’re willing to reach short-term tactical understandings with Israel, but the long-term peace they seek involves Israel’s violent disappearance.
However, that is not the position of most governments in the Arab world. Egypt and Jordan maintain a publicly frosty peace with Israel, while privately co-operating with it. As a result of the Abraham Accords of 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco have diplomatic relations with Israel.
And if Israel would extend even a small olive branch to the Palestinians and the possibility of a future Palestinian state, Saudi Arabia would quickly normalize relations with Israel.
Don’t tell the campus protesters, but moderate Arab states see Iran and its Islamist proxies as existential threats, while viewing Israel as no threat and even a potential ally. There’s a long-standing alignment of interests. Sudden success against Hezbollah creates an opportunity to further them.
Will the Netanyahu government seize this opportunity? It’s doubtful.
Ideally, Israel should offer to immediately start direct peace talks with the legitimate government of Lebanon – bypassing Hezbollah – with the aim of negotiating a comprehensive settlement of all disputes between the two countries. The United States, the Europeans and most of the Arab world would cheer.
And with Hamas reduced to a guerilla force in Gaza, now is the moment for Israel to surprise everyone by offering to talk to moderate Arab regimes about the establishment of an international administration in Gaza, as a first step to an eventual, post-Hamas Palestinian state.
Unfortunately, Mr. Netanyahu is unlikely to take the first opportunity, and he’s repeatedly refused even the smallest steps on the second. He and his allies in government have given every sign that they see a future Palestinian state as a threat, not an opportunity. Mr. Netanyahu has long undermined and delegitimized the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank – which for all its faults is at least willing to talk to and work with Israel – while effectively empowering Hamas, which is committed to a one-state solution through the barrel of the gun.
Forty-two years ago, Israel invaded Lebanon to try to eliminate Palestine Liberation Organization guerillas who had long lobbed rockets across the border. By one measure, the operation was a success: The PLO was pushed back, defeated and forced to evacuate its forces from Lebanon. But short-term battlefield success bred bigger threats. By the time Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, the old danger on the northern border had been replaced by something worse. Hezbollah was better organized and far more heavily armed than the PLO, and backed by Iran.
In 2006, Israeli forces again went into Lebanon, and eventually achieved a small diplomatic victory in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Under its terms, Lebanon’s government was supposed to regain full control of its territory; Hezbollah was to disarm; and a UN peacekeeping force was to make sure it remained north of the Litani River, 30 kilometres from the border.
None of that happened. Opportunity missed.
In 1973, Israel was surrounded by enemies sworn to the pursuit of its destruction. That’s no longer the map. Today, most Arab governments are primarily focused on the very real threat from Iran and its proxies. They fear Tehran, not Tel Aviv.
There’s opportunity there.