Jason Lee/The Associated Press
Creso Sá is a distinguished professor of science policy, higher education and innovation, and vice-dean of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.
Canada’s Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern, or STRAC, has recently been introduced ostensibly to safeguard national security and economic interests. The policy identifies the “illicit transfer of knowledge” in key areas of science and technology that could have military applications as posing “major challenge to Canada and its allies.”
To prevent this from happening, the policy creates an oversight mechanism over research proposals including international collaborators in designated areas and institutions. While generally well received for providing clarity to universities considering mounting anxieties about inappropriate international research partnerships, the policy will arguably spur negative unintended consequences and fail to substantively address its stated goal.
The policy identifies a list of “Sensitive Technology Research Areas” and a list of “Named Research Organizations” – research institutions that are deemed to present a risk to Canada’s national security because of their linkages with foreign defence sectors. While the list is ostensibly of organizations and not countries, it only includes mostly Chinese institutions, followed by Russian and Iranian entities. As of 2024, federal grant funding applications in those areas including an applicant who works for or has been supported by the listed research organizations will be rejected. This is a more decisive step than the previous National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships trialed by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council since 2021.
While STRAC’s lists regulates eligibility to federal funding, we now have officially designated research institutions deemed to be hostile actors by the federal government. The broader impacts of this to academic exchange and Canada’s ability to continuously benefit from “brain gain” cannot be underestimated.
Recall the case of Yuekang Li, who was accepted to a PhD program at the University of Waterloo. Late in 2023, a federal judge upheld a decision by a visa officer to deny a student visa to Mr. Li based on the potential risk of espionage. The officer based his decision on Mr. Li’s field of study (microfluidics) being regarded as a strategic priority for the Chinese government, his previous affiliation with Beihang University (which has ties to China’s defence sector), and reports on China’s efforts to engage in non-traditional espionage through overseas students and scientists. This decision was considered “precedent-setting” for its interpretation of espionage and handling by the chief justice of the federal court.
Building on this precedent, visa officers and border agents may now easily turn to the STRAC lists for guidance on whom might be considered a risk to Canada. Potential international students, visiting scholars and research collaborators who have at one time worked or studied at one of the NROs might be deemed inadmissible. An expansive definition on whom might be a potential spy may encroach into Canada’s ability to attract global talent.
One might argue that unintended consequences notwithstanding, the policy has a clear rationale to protect Canada’s national interests. However, that would assume that STRAC has a lot more power than it actually does.
Consider that Canada has consistently failed to keep up with investments in R&D and that the federal government has never gotten close to addressing research funding shortages identified in the 2017 and 2023 reviews it commissioned. It is fairly clear that Canada is decidedly less competitive in terms of its ability to fund cutting-edge science relative to other major industrial economies now than it used to be two decades ago.
China, on the other hand, has dramatically increased its scientific output in this period, overtaking the United States not only in terms of publication volume but also in scientific output in selective journals. There may indeed by pockets of excellence in Canadian science in the fields covered by STRAC that provide unique opportunities for Chinese researchers working on potential military applications. However, the reality is that Chinese scientists can as easily collaborate with scientists elsewhere who can access more competitive research funding systems.
Practically speaking, Chinese institutions can also easily access the expertise they require for further technological advances through a multitude of means, including recruiting scientists from abroad and sponsoring research projects enlisting international collaborators.
On the surface, Canada’s STRAC policy appears to be an appropriate response to legitimate concerns. While the intent to safeguard federally funded research and related intellectual property is valid, the policy creates conditions likely to generate negative unintended consequences for academic exchange and Canada’s ability to benefit from brain gain. It is also likely to accomplish little in terms of its ostensible goals, since China in particular has ample resources and alternatives to pursue military applications of global science and technology.