Palestinians look at the destruction after an Israeli airstrike on a crowded tent camp housing Palestinians displaced by the war, in Muwasi, Gaza Strip, on Sept. 10.Abdel Kareem Hana/The Associated Press
On Oct. 7, 2023, from secret tunnels beneath the streets of a small and isolated Middle Eastern city, Yahya Sinwar set out to change history.
To understand how a war might end, you have to look at why it started.
Mr. Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, launched his bloody assault with two things in mind. He had a military objective: Inflict as much damage as possible on Israel, with a focus on killing civilians and taking hostages. But his military means were in service of larger political ends: stopping the process of Arab countries normalizing relations with Israel, provoking a wider war, and reinvigorating the project for replacing Israel with a Palestinian state – a project which once had the support of the entire Arab world, but no longer does.
Until a generation ago, the great rift in the Middle East was referred to as the Arab-Israeli conflict. But starting in the 1970s, more and more Arab governments came to recognize that taking part simply wasn’t in their national interest. Before Oct. 7, Saudi Arabia was poised to become the latest and most important Arab state to normalize relations with Israel.
The old Arab-Israeli conflict is gone; in its place are two other conflicts – distinct but related.
The first is, of course, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The second contest, which did not exist until the 1980s, involves the Islamic Republic of Iran and its constellation of mostly Shia Muslim militias, which treat the elimination of Israel as a religious duty.
That’s why Israel quickly found itself in a multifront war after Oct. 7, facing not only Hamas in Gaza but also drone and missile attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon and well-armed Iranian-allied militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Israel has nevertheless made significant military advances over the past year – and especially the past month. Yet the conflict, or conflicts, appear no closer to permanent resolution. There are a couple of reasons for that.
The first is that, however much Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks about destroying Hamas, he has refused to say what comes next. He’s offered no political or diplomatic solution for the day after. And so, the Israel Defence Forces go into neighbourhoods in Gaza, bomb and fight Hamas, cause heavy civilian casualties – and then withdraw. And then do it all over again a few months later. And again.
Mr. Netanyahu’s goal appears to be to remove Hamas from Gaza, yet somehow have nothing – not Israeli occupation, not the Palestinian Authority, not an Arab peacekeeping force – take its place.
If all political options are off the table in Gaza, the only possible outcome is permanent war. But that will make it impossible for moderate Arab states to work with Israel. It also undermines the Palestinian Authority, which notionally runs much of the occupied West Bank, while radicalizing West Bank Palestinians and encouraging them to rally to Hamas.
These are Mr. Sinwar’s goals.
On the other front, in Lebanon, Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership opens the possibility of peace on the northern border. But that, too, can only be secured through a political solution. Israel can drive Hezbollah fighters out of an area, but they will return. It can kill Hezbollah’s leaders; new ones will be appointed. The only thing that can provide Israel with permanent security in the north is for the failed state of Lebanon to stop being a failed state.
Moderate Arab regimes, led by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would be very happy to see Iran’s proxy removed from its dominance of Lebanon, and replaced by an actual Lebanese government. So would Turkey. So would most Lebanese, who are neither Shia Muslims nor Hezbollah supporters.
Israel, along with Arab countries that see Tehran as the main threat, have a rare opportunity to make major gains in the conflict with Iran. The Islamic State built what it has described as a ring of fire around Israel, yet Israel has abruptly weakened the strongest link in the chain, Hezbollah. But a door opened by military means cannot be secured by military means alone. Israel needs the help of Arab states, and the people of Lebanon, to permanently diminish Hezbollah, and prevent it from restarting its crusade on Israel’s northern border.
Such a political accord could yet come together – because removing Lebanon from Iran’s sphere of influence is of great interest to those Arab states that are just as much in Tehran’s sights as is Israel.
But the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the foundational conflict that helps feed all the other conflicts, remains as stuck as ever. More Israeli military “successes” in Gaza cannot resolve it. In fact, the more military “success” Israel has in Gaza, the more it undermines its ability to do deals with Arab countries that want to ally with it against Iran.
Once again, this is as Mr. Sinwar intended.
However difficult it is for post-Oct. 7 Israel to ponder concessions and compromises, the Palestinians must be offered at least the hint of the possibility of a future that is something other than permanent occupation and permanent war. It’s not a guaranteed way out. But its absence blocks the possibility of any way out at all.